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HONORING
JOSEPH R. GRODIN:
Joseph Grodin's Contributions to
Public Sector Collective BargainingLaw
ALVIN L. GOLDMAN*

INTRODUCTION

T

he Labor Law Group, established in the early 1950s, is a unique con-

sortium of labor law professors, and usually a practitioner or two, devoted to improving labor and employment law teaching and scholarship.
Its primary activities have been publication of course books and sponsorship of conferences on important new developments. All royalty income
goes into a trust fund used solely for carrying on the Group's work. By luck
more than by merit, I was invited to join the Group around 1969. Because
I had practiced labor law for only a few years on the East Coast before entering law teaching in Kentucky and because I have never been a diligent
reader of scholarly articles, the name Joseph Grodin was unfamiliar to me
when, around 1971 or 1972, the late Professor Benjamin Aaron proposed
him for membership in the Labor Law Group.

This article is one of a group published here on the occasion of the UC Hastings
College of the Law Tribute Honoring Distinguished Emeritus Professor of Law and former California Supreme Court Associate Justice Joseph R. Grodin, November 12, 2015.
Professor Emeritus, University of Kentucky College of Law.
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Realizing that most of us were from the east, south and mid-west, Ben,
as I recall, explained that his nominee had recently entered law teaching fulltime at Hastings and, though still a young man, had already distinguished
himself as a leading California practitioner.' Ben most likely also noted his
candidate's adjunct teaching experience, a few of his publications, and probably mentioned his doctorate from the London School of Economics. The
2
potential value of this addition to the Group was immediately recognized,
and we unanimously invited him into membership with a plea to Ben to
persuade him to accept our invitation. About a year later the Group met in
Denver. It was there I met Joe and Janet Grodin for the first time and discovered the broad range of their interests 3 and accomplishments as well as
their congenial personalities. In time, my wife got to meet them both and we
developed a friendship that Ellie and I cherish.
The scope and intensity of Joseph Grodin's intellectual drive have resulted in his making important contributions to developments in a variety
of areas of law. Because our relationship grew out of a shared interest in labor and employment law, this essay focuses on his work in one subcategory
of that field - the law of public sector collective bargaining representation.
DEVELOPING THE LAW OF PUBLIC SECTOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Prior to joining academe, Joe had published pieces dealing with private
sector labor-management law. At the time he began teaching fulltime, his
scholarly efforts initially shifted to public sector labor-management relations, an area of growing importance that was in need of more academic
scrutiny and law school course materials. In time, as a scholar, law teacher
and jurist, Joe Grodin helped meet both needs.
While on leave of absence from his law firm, Joe taught labor law, constitutional law and administrative law at the University of Oregon. Despite

1 Joe's time in practice was especially long and impressive in comparison with the
experience of all but two or three of the Group's academicians.
2 Indeed, I was awed by his credentials.
3 The Grodins' passion for music, the graphic arts, wilderness hiking and Judaic
learning, occasionally are encountered in metaphors, analogies and quotations found
in Joe's writings.
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a newcomer's burdens of preparing for teaching in three demanding areas,
he managed to co-author 4 an article5 describing the general contours of
the field of collective representation for government sector workers. The
article was primarily directed at a newly adopted Oregon statute and provided what amounted to a guidebook for those operating under the state's
complex public sector bargaining legislation, regulations, and attorney
general's opinions. It also presented suggestions for improving the new law
by removing identified statutory ambiguities, gaps, and uncertainties. Additionally, Professor Grodin and his co-author offered a number of broader
observations about public sector collective bargaining laws. For example,
using Oregon's experience, they noted how political and institutional ri6
valries often add complexities and uncertainties to these statutes.
A brief footnote in the Oregon article addressed the potential value of
strikes in most public sector bargaining. This was an important issue the
future jurist would face a little more than a decade later. In a concurring
opinion in El Rancho Unified School Dist. v. NationalEducationAssn., Justice Grodin observed that the common law justification for barring public employee strikes was based on the assumption that it interferes with
the legislature's activity in establishing the terms of government employment through statutory and administrative fiat. However, he noted that by
authorizing a procedure for bilateral determination of local government
employee wages and benefits through collective bargaining, the legislature
had removed the common law's justification for the work stoppage prohibition.7 A few years later, in County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles
County Employees' Assn., 8 Justice Grodin joined the California Supreme
Court's plurality opinion that took this reasoning a step further and announced that the state common law no longer assumes that a strike by
public employees is unlawful "unless or until it is clearly demonstrated
4 Typical of Prof. Grodin's sense of decency, he gave full co-author credit to Mark
Hardin, a third year law student, rather than follow the common practice of merely
dropping a footnote to acknowledge the efforts of a student assistant.
Mr. Hardin had a distinguished career aiding abused and neglected children and
served as Director of Child Welfare at the ABA Center on Children and the Law.
5 "Public Employee Bargaining in Oregon," 51 OR. L. REV. 5 (1971).
6 51 Or. L. Rev. at p. 9.
7 33 Cal. 3d 946, 963 (1983).
8 38 Cal. 3d 564 (1985).
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that such a strike creates a substantial and imminent threat to the health or
safety of the public."9 Among other considerations, the opinion examined
the economic realities of public sector collective bargaining and found that
government entities that had engaged in collective bargaining had demonstrated that they have sufficient negotiating leverage so that work stoppages are a fair counter-balance for generating reasonable settlements.
When he began teaching fulltime at Hastings, Professor Grodin followed up on his Oregon study by preparing a comprehensive survey of
California's primary public sector bargaining law that he published as an
article in the Hastings Law Journal.'0 Noting that California had entered
this field earlier than most other jurisdictions, he expressed disappointment that his home state's core legislation in this area, the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, lacked a comprehensive, intelligible, and forward-looking
framework for public sector labor relations. One egregious gap, he observed, was the lack of a structure for resolving questions of a labor organization's representational status - a problem he had encountered while
still in law practice." Another major problem was the lack of a precise
list of prohibited actions that violate representational rights. These problems persisted until, gradually, over the next four decades, the California
Legislature partially mitigated them by adopting amendments, consistent
with some of Professor Grodin's recommendations, that a) established an
administrative agency with specialized expertise to adjudicate and remedy
prohibited employment practices and conduct elections,' 2 b) delineated in
greater detail the protections afforded the right to representation, 3 and c)
4
provided mechanisms to facilitate bargaining impasse resolution.'
The California courts, on the other hand, were much quicker to embrace
Professor Grodin's careful analysis of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act's intent which gave the courts a basis for coping with critical gaps in the statutory language. They similarly were guided by his suggested approaches to
9 38 Cal. 3d at 586.
10

J. Grodin, "Public Employee Bargaining in California: The Meyers-Milias-

Brown Act in the Courts", 23 HASTINGS L.J. 719, 720-22 (1972).
11 Id. at 743-46 and text accompanying footnotes 114-119.
12 Id. at 728-29, 745; Cal. Gov. Code § 3541.
13 Public Employee Bargaining,supra note 10 at 727-28, 746-48; Cal. Gov. Code
§ 3506.5, 3508.5.
14 Public Employee Bargainingat 755-60; Cal. Gov. Code § 3505.4-.5.
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interpreting particular provisions in which the language of the Act was
burdened by vagueness. Accordingly, the Hastings article was cited and followed frequently by the California courts.' 5
In noting the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act's absence of statutory impasse resolution procedures, Prof. Grodin's Hastings article observed that
many public employee bargaining laws provided for fact-finding with recommendations and impasse arbitration.' 6 Prof. Grodin soon explored the
potential value of those approaches in a study he made of a new amend17
ment to the Nevada public employment bargaining law.
The Grodin study of the Nevada statute explained that while fact-finding had been part of the state's public employment collective bargaining
law for several years, a significant number of Nevada public employers had
been ignoring fact-finding recommendations. 18 This led the state legislature to adopt an amendment allowing the governor, on the request of either party, to make the fact-finder's recommendations binding on all sides
regarding any or all deadlocked issues in local government collective bargaining. Thus, if requested prior to the commencement of fact-finding, the
15 Decisions citing and approving the Grodin article's analysis include L.A. County Civil Corn v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 55 (1978) and Public Employees of Riverside
County v. County ofRiverside, 75 Cal. App. 3d 882 (1977) (holding that rules adopted by
local entities must be consistent with the purposes of the Meyers -Milias -Brown Act);
Vernon Fire Fightersv. City of Vernon, 107 Cal. App. 3d 802 (1980) (unilateral changes in
terms of employment are aperse violation of the duty to meet and confer in good faith);
Solano County Employees' Assn. v. County of Solano, 136 Cal. App. 3d 256 (1982) and
InternationalAsso. of Fire Fighters Union v. Pleasanton,56 Cal. App. 3d 959 (1976) (injunctive relief should be granted where a local government made changes in the terms
of employment without conferring with the employees' representative).
The Public Employee Bargainingarticle on the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act has been
declared "the single most frequently cited authority on how the statute works." C. Cameron, "No Ordinary Joe: Joseph R. Grodin and His Influence on California's Law of the
Workplace," 52 HASTINGS L.J. 253, 267 (2001).
16 Public Employee Bargaining,supra note 10, at 759.
As noted below, impasse arbitration is more commonly called "interest arbitration" to distinguish it from grievance arbitration. The award in interest arbitration is
an imposed settlement of the unresolved terms of the negotiating parties' contract. The
award in grievance arbitration is a judgment establishing whether one of the disputing
parties was wronged, and if so, what remedy should be provided.
17 J. Grodin, "Arbitration of Public Sector Labor Disputes: The Nevada Experiment," 28 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 89 (1974).
18 Id. at 91.
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governor could transform fact-finding into binding impasse arbitration. 19
Prof. Grodin's study observed that while other states had procedures for
ascertaining whether to require the parties to submit to final, binding arbitration of a public sector bargaining impasse, Nevada's law was unique in
placing this authority in the hands of an elected official.
At the time of the study there was too little data for a statistical analysis
of the amendment's impact on Nevada's public sector collective bargaining system. Therefore, Prof. Grodin approached his task by examining the
circumstances in which public sector bargaining impasses posed an opportunity to apply the new law, the outcomes, and the parties' own impressions of any changes in the dynamics of collective experiences under the
amended statute. He also conducted interviews with neutrals involved in
Nevada's arbitrated cases inasmuch as their conduct was bound to influ20
ence the parties' subsequent negotiating conduct.
The Grodin study sought to ascertain whether the prospect of binding
arbitration had a chilling affect on the efforts of local governments and
employee organizations to resolve their differences through bargaining
rather than rely on a settlement imposed by an arbitrator. He found that
the evidence leaned in the opposite direction and attributed this in part to
the Act's efforts to guide both the decision as to whether to require binding
arbitration and the guidelines imposed on arbitrators.
The Nevada Act set out criteria to be considered by the governor when
electing whether to impose arbitration in seemingly deadlocked negotiations. Although Prof. Grodin contended that those statutory guidelines
were too vague to be meaningful, he found that in the first couple of years
operating under the amended statute, two considerations were important
in the governor's decisions to impose or not impose binding arbitration.
One was the governor's impression of whether in the past the parties had
given due consideration to fact-finding recommendations. The other was
whether their bargaining to date was consistent with what he judged to
be a good faith, reasonable effort to resolve differences at the bargaining
table. 2 1 Prof. Grodin observed that these elusive elements in the governor's
at 89-90.
Id. at 99-101.
A history of ignoring fact-finding recommendations was likely to result in im-

19 Id.
20

21

posing binding arbitration whereas bargaining efforts considered by the governor to
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decision left the parties with considerable uncertainty that itself may have
propelled them to greater efforts to reach a negotiated settlement.
Additionally, because the Act required the arbitrator to assess the local
government's financial ability as well as its obligation to provide facilities
and services protecting the community's health, welfare, and safety, Prof.
Grodin found that, once a decision was made to require binding arbitration, the parties had further motivation to reach their own settlement. That
motivation partly was to avoid the extra costs involved in presenting their
case to an arbitrator whose expenses they would have to share equally. In
part, too, the motivation was to avoid the costs of preparing for the arbitrator a budget-oriented presentation necessitated by the statute's emphasis
on ability to pay.22 Additionally, Grodin found that this guidance helped
press the parties to do a better job of preparing for bargaining and, thereby,
23
facilitated more productive settlement discussions.
Prof. Grodin's conclusions found that the success of the amended approach was facilitated by the fact that the then-governor had a labor relations background. Therefore, the study suggested that to ensure that the
system continued to function well it would be best to place the responsibility of deciding whether and when to impose binding arbitration in the
hands of a person or tribunal with labor relations expertise. The Nevada
law has since been amended to give this authority to a panel consisting
of an accountant and a lawyer selected by the parties through the procedure of mutually striking names separately provided by the Nevada State
Board of Accountancy and the State Bar of Nevada. 24 The wisdom of Prof.
Grodin's suggested change, therefore, is dependent upon whether the appropriate expertise in the labor field is possessed by the persons proposed
by the Accountancy Board and the Bar.
The growth of public employee collective bargaining was accompanied
by an increase in work stoppages and work stoppage threats. This resulted
in increased scholarly and political attention to the merits or problems of
work stoppage substitutes, especially resolution of bargaining impasses by
reveal a good faith reasonable effort to negotiate a settlement were likely to result in
declining to impose binding arbitration. 28 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. at 95-96.
22 Id. at 97-98.
23 Id. at 98-99.
24 Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 288.200 to .202.
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impartial third parties, a procedure most commonly known as interest arbitration. Although he had previously discussed interest arbitration in his
writings, in 1976 Professor Grodin published a paper that comprehensively
examined the theoretical issue of whether such arbitration violates the democratic principle that "governmental policy is to be determined by persons
responsible, directly or indirectly, to the electorate. ' 25 He explained that the
issue is particularly compelling because issues involved in public sector col26
lective bargaining "can involve significant elements of social planning.
Prof. Grodin observed that, due to the complexity of modern government and the need to insulate some decisions from political intrusions,
courts have been reluctant to place rigid constitutional constraints on legislative discretion to delegate legislative-type decisions. Accordingly, he
focused not on what restrictions might be required by constitutional doctrine but rather on what, as a matter of sound policy, legislatures ought to
27
do in delegating authority to interest arbitrators.
At the outset of his analysis Prof. Grodin confronted what may be the
politically most delicate issue respecting legislative delegation of authority
for arbitrators to decide collective bargaining impasses in the public sector: How can the legislature justify authorizing non-elected persons to resolve public employment pay disputes? His succinct but compelling answer
stated that the arbitration system should "presuppose a policy determination that employees should be paid whatever they are 'worth,' in the same
way that public agencies purchase goods at whatever price the market dictates. ' 28 To help discipline the decisional process, he suggested a variety of
guideposts such as the increase in the cost of living or private sector collectively bargained wages for employees doing similar work. Grodin labeled
this approach "the proper wage model" and argued that in applying it an
arbitrator should not weigh the public's ability to afford the result; rather,
fiscal shortfalls should require the public employer to respond by reducing
the affected work force and services, shifting funds from other parts of its
budget, raising taxes or borrowing.
25

J.Grodin, "Political Aspects of Public Sector Interest Arbitration," 64 CAL. L.

REV. 678, 680 (1976).
26 Id. at 682.
27 Id. at 683.
28 Id. at 684.
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Being a realist, Prof. Grodin acknowledged a degree of artificiality in
the proper wage model formula inasmuch as private sector wages for similar work often vary; the determination of whether work is "similar" often
is subjective; some work is unique to the public sector; and the public sector often is the dominant source of some types of work and, therefore, the
dominant influence of wage rates for its private sector counterpart. Additionally, he noted that even the more concrete cost-of-living guidepost
poses a problem inasmuch as when those costs go up for employees, they
also go up for government operations and, thereby, may impose a fiscal
squeeze that limits the government's ability to meet all of its obligations,
29
including providing cost of living increases for its workers.
Political pressures, Prof. Grodin noted, give rise to demands that arbitrators not ignore the government's ability to pay. Thus, that requirement
was common in legislation mandating interest arbitration as a work stoppage substitute. However, his survey of existing public sector bargaining
laws that used interest arbitration revealed that references to weighing
30
ability to pay were vague as to how that factor is to be taken into account.
Professor Grodin expressed concern that this vague requirement regarding ability to pay inevitably shifts to the unelected arbitrator the burden of
making broad public policy choices.
Of at least equal concern in Prof. Grodin's analysis of public sector
interest arbitration is the observation that many non-wage collective bargaining issues pose even more difficult problems of allowing social policy
choices being delegated to the discretion of a non-elected decider. Examples such as school room class size or social worker case loads implicate
broad educational or other policy choices while retirement and other employee welfare benefit programs can have long-range fiscal impacts that
alter revenue-raising needs. This, argued Prof. Grodin, poses the need to
structure the bargaining impasse system so as to preserve as much as possible the responsibility of elected officials to guide such choices, and he
posed a number of suggestions toward this end. One is that statutes providing for interest arbitration should more specifically describe the weight
29

Id. at 685. Depending on the government entity's tax structure, a cost of living

increase can, of course, be accompanied by increased government revenue from sources
such as sales taxes.
30 Id. at 687.
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to be given to the public entity's ability to pay and identify the various
income and expenditure elements that can be considered in weighing ability to pay.3 1 He also advocated consolidating interest arbitration for all employee groups with the same public employer inasmuch as they feed from
32
a common pie.
The interest arbitration article additionally emphasizes the importance
of judicial review to set aside public sector interest awards that violate the
statutory constraints placed on the process. However, it also urges that
initial review of challenged interest awards should be assigned to a state
labor relations board in order to provide a more expeditious procedure
enhanced by the benefit of specialized expertise and greater uniformity of
results. 33 Further, the article warns that, because issues can change during
the course of the arbitral proceeding, courts should avoid intervening prematurely. Accordingly, as a general rule they should not entertain efforts to
34
enjoin the process on the grounds of non-arbitrability.
A decision by the Michigan Supreme Court, a few years later, demonstrated the care with which Prof. Grodin had weighed the competing considerations for evaluating public sector interest arbitration arrangements.
That decision, which upheld the constitutionality of the state's interest arbitration system for police and firefighter bargaining impasses, cited the
Grodin article as authority for stated arguments in both the majority and
35
dissenting opinions.
DEVELOPING TEACHING MATERIALS
PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING

ON

Normally, in our country a lawyer's and jurist's foundation for understanding law and the legal process begins in law school and for many, perhaps most, that understanding is also primarily shaped by law school studies. Because most law school classes are centered on materials presented
in the assigned course book, well-designed, thoughtful course books can
31 Id. at 695.
32

Id.

699-700.
Id. at 699.
35 Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers Asso., 408 Mich. 410 (1980).
33 Id.
34
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be expected to significantly influence what is taught and how it is taught.
Therefore, preparing course books can significantly influence developments in the particular area of law.
Within a few years after he joined the Labor Law Group, Joesph Grodin
teamed with Donald Wollett to co-author the Group's revised course book
on public sector collective bargaining, then a new area of law school study.
The team of Wollett and Grodin provided a particularly valuable perspective inasmuch as these two scholars were also seasoned practitioners from
both sides of the bargaining table. Don Wollett had been a partner in a
major management firm in New York City;36 Joe Grodin in a major union
firm in San Francisco. Joe, Don, and other Group members produced further revisions of the Public Sector Bargaining book into the 1990s and,
after Don retired from the task, Joe and others continued its revision and
updating into the current century. Joe eventually retired from the project
but its successor course book, now expanded to cover non-collective bargaining aspects of public sector employment, continues to be the source for
teaching public employment collective bargaining law.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Joseph Grodin's studies, discourses, decisions, and teaching in the area of
public sector labor law are bound together by several threads that demonstrate his adherence to values and work habits he discussed in his book In
37
Pursuit of Justice.
Both as Prof. Grodin and as Justice Grodin, he has been faithful to
the principle that legal rules ultimately are the prerogative of democratically elected representatives. His regard for legislative authority is evident
in the care with which he examined the competing interests that gave rise
to the compromises reached in adopting the public sector bargaining laws
he studied, thereby gaining more accurate understanding of the intent of

36 Kaye Scholer Fierman Hays & Handler. Donald Wollett had experienced both
perspectives inasmuch as he represented the National Education Association for about
a decade. During the course of their team effort, Wollett's understanding of public employment collective bargaining was further enhanced by his serving for several years as
the New York State Director of Employee Relations.

37 University of California Press, 1989. See, especially, chapters 9 and 10.
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those laws. It is also evident in his proposals for improving them through
suggested legislative changes rather than creative judicial interpretations.
Additional evidence of Joe Grodin's efforts to preserve the central role
of elective government is his examination of public sector interest arbitration. There his focus emphasized how to maximize labor peace and equitable results without unduly delegating to non-elected persons the authority
to shape social policies.
Finally, both as a professor and a jurist, Joseph Grodin has also directed his efforts at discovering not only what is theoretically reasonable,
but also what is practical. Thus, in determining what improvements have
been attempted and what reforms would be beneficial, Prof. Grodin has
tried to discover practitioner insights into the effect law has on the parties'
conduct. His research and discourses have not been confined to the typical
academic analysis of archived decisions and documents or weighing the
logic of competing arguments. Rather, his studies have reflected his respect
for those who put flesh on the legal skeleton by including interviews to
learn about the experiences of the officials, lawyers, and other decisionmakers who work within the statutory system.
Accordingly, the integrity with which Joseph Grodin serves California,
our nation, and the study of law deserves our admiration and gratitude.
*r

*r
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